Matches played in the group stage are different from the knockout rounds in any international competition.
Theoretically, opponents get tougher when you progress to the latter stages of any tournament and they also have a better idea of how you have been playing up to that point.
After three games, it’s possible to analyse how a team plays on and off the ball with a recent sample, rather than one taken from international friendlies in March and June.
If we take Germany as an example, their opponents know by now that in possession, Toni Kroos will drop into the left side of the defence to form a 3-1 shape with Robert Andrich ahead of him.
From this deep-lying position, Kroos conducts Germany’s attacks as they try to find the three narrow No 10s between the lines. “Playing with Toni, I have the freedom to stay more in front and wait because you know the ball at some point is going to come,” Ilkay Gundogan recently told The Athletic.
“He reads the game, gives us balance with and without the ball, and he gives other players like me more freedom to get in dangerous positions.”
Therefore, any team that wants to limit Germany’s threat on the ball and not fall victim to Gundogan, Jamal Musiala, Kai Havertz and Florian Wirtz’s intricate combinations has to stop the supply from its source.
The round of 16 brought up a new contender as Denmark were looking to do that by pressing Germany’s 3-1 build-up first and dealing with the rest of the problems later.
Out of their 5-4-1 shape, Denmark focused on pressing Antonio Rudiger, Nico Schlotterbeck and Kroos using Christian Eriksen, Rasmus Hojlund and Andreas Skov Olsen, with Thomas Delaney and Pierre-Emile Hojbjerg in zonal roles behind them.
Eriksen had a complex role because he had to drop and support Denmark’s left wing-back and centre-back, but Skov Olsen’s main task without the ball was to smother Kroos and not allow him time on the ball.
The logical question was how Denmark used five players to press four Germany players without getting into trouble because that numerical advantage provided Julian Nagelsmann’s team with a six-versus-five scenario behind Delaney and Hojbjerg.
The first part of the answer was that Denmark’s midfield duo dropped to help their centre-backs track Leroy Sane, Gundogan and Musiala.
Here, Skov Olsen presses Kroos and Delaney collects the deflected pass, but even if it bypasses the forward, Hojbjerg is moving towards Musiala.
The other was that Denmark’s back five switched markers effectively to defend against Germany’s three No 10s.
In this example, Schlotterbeck finds a passing angle into Gundogan, but Jannik Vestergaard immediately jumps towards the Germany captain and Joachim Andersen moves inside to pick up Havertz.
Gundogan then tries to flick the ball to the Arsenal forward, but Andersen intercepts it and starts the counter-attack by finding Skov Olsen.
Germany’s impressive start to the game was tranquilised by Denmark’s organisation without the ball, which also created transitional situations for Kasper Hjulmand’s team. Skov Olsen’s pressure forced Kroos into safer passes instead of line-breaking ones and, on the odd occasion, a wrong one.
Denmark’s best chance in the first half came from winning the ball and striking on the counter. Here, Eriksen is deeper to support the left side of Denmark’s defence, Hojbjerg is picking up Gundogan, Skov Olsen is pressing Schlotterbeck, and Hojlund is in position to limit Kroos’ time on the ball. This forces the Germany midfielder to play the quickest available pass into Musiala and Andersen jumps to press him.
Musiala tries to find Andrich, but Delaney intercepts the pass to start the counter-attack and it ends with Manuel Neuer saving a one-versus-one situation against Hojlund.
Denmark’s approach off the ball limited Germany’s attacking threat in open play, but Nagelsmann’s team have shown that they have multiple solutions on the ball.
Due to Eriksen’s complex role out of possession, Rudiger had more time on the ball compared to Schlotterbeck and Kroos and the Real Madrid defender tried to find Havertz’s run behind the defence on multiple occasions.
Similar to the move in the 2-0 victory against Hungary, Havertz attacked the space behind the wide centre-back when the latter moved up to mark one of Germany’s No 10s.
In this example, Eriksen is deeper than Skov Olsen, which allows Rudiger more time on the ball compared to Kroos.
While the centre-back is searching for runners, Havertz attacks the space behind Andreas Christensen, who has to keep an eye on Sane. Rudiger’s pass finds Havertz, but Vestergaard is in the correct position to defend this attack.
In another example, Andersen moves up to track Musiala’s positioning between the lines and Havertz smartly moves towards the vacant space in Denmark’s defence.
When Andrich plays the ball to Rudiger, Havertz is in position to attack the space behind Andersen…
… and he makes a run into that area while being on Vestergaard’s blind side. Rudiger finds him…
… but Havertz’s shot is saved by Kasper Schmeichel.
Despite Rudiger’s long passes being a viable attacking option, Germany needed to tweak their setup to ask Denmark different questions.
In the second half, they changed their build-up by moving from a 3-1 shape to a 4-2 one with Kroos next to Andrich and started the attacks from deeper positions.
Denmark reacted by pushing Hojbjerg to mark Kroos, but this increased the distance between their midfield and defensive line, leaving them vulnerable in that area and in case they pushed up, Germany’s centre-backs could play long passes behind the defence.
In this example, Havertz drops to offer himself as a passing option, forcing Denmark’s defence to move up. Schlotterbeck spots Musiala’s complementary run behind the defence, which is being pulled in two directions, and plays the ball into his path, with Sane making a similar run on the other side.
Musiala’s cutback is intercepted by Vestergaard but Germany manage to win a penalty kick from this attack after David Raum’s cross strikes Andersen’s right hand. Havertz scored from the spot to give them the lead.
Germany’s second goal came from an identical situation. Here, Hojbjerg and Delaney push up towards Kroos and Emre Can and Musiala drops into the space between the lines, forcing Andersen to follow him.
Musiala then changes his direction and makes a run behind the defence, where Schlotterbeck plays the long pass…
… and the Bayern Munich forward puts the ball into the bottom corner to make it 2-0.
In the second part of the first half, Germany suffered on and off the ball, but adjusting their build-up shape at half-time and moving to a clearer back five out of possession with the introduction of Can put them on track to the quarter-finals.
Germany’s individual quality and cohesive style make them a strong contender to win the tournament — their ability to tweak their approach only adds to their strengths.
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