When Gareth Southgate’s impressive record with England is brought up, the response generally refers to the calibre of players at his disposal — far better than the crop of a decade ago, for example.
That’s entirely fair. A manager can only be judged in relation to the tools at his disposal. But perhaps more of a blessing than the quality of footballers in English football at the moment is the quality of managers.
After all, England have had great generations of footballer before. The ‘golden generation’ featured players who had finished 1st (Michael Owen), 2nd (David Beckham, Frank Lampard) and 3rd (Steven Gerrard) in the Ballon d’Or voting, for example. The side of 2004-06 had few obvious outfield weaknesses, whereas just this summer Southgate was scrabbling around for genuine left-sided width and an established partner for Declan Rice in the team’s engine room.
But Southgate has also been managing in the era when the Premier League has attracted the biggest coaching names in the world. England’s problem in the golden generation years wasn’t about individual talent, it was about tactical intelligence. English players were inflexible and at times naive.
Today, English players are accustomed to playing in a variety of systems and therefore that is no longer an excuse. And in Southgate’s first major tournament, at World Cup 2018, that was particularly obvious.
(Clive Rose/Getty Images)
Southgate’s 3-5-2 system was, in various ways, quite progressive. England hadn’t regularly played a three-man defence for a couple of decades, but the popularity of that approach in the wake of Antonio Conte’s success in the Premier League with Chelsea made it more viable.
In fielding Jordan Henderson — previously considered an energetic box-to-box player — in the holding role, Southgate was borrowing from Jurgen Klopp, who was deploying him similarly at that time. And in completing the midfield triangle by using both Jesse Lingard and Dele Alli, seemingly two No 10s, Southgate was essentially using the ‘free eights’ approach popularised by Pep Guardiola.
Of course, England didn’t quite play football of the calibre of those sides. But with an unusual — and quite daring — starting XI, they outplayed opponents while looking defensively secure. Some of the patterns of play, particularly with Sterling, Lingard and Alli running off Kane, made England genuinely exciting for the first time in decades.
(Mladen Antonov/AFP via Getty Images)
One of the issues with appointing Southgate in the first place, however, was that he was actually very inexperienced as a senior manager. His three years in charge of Middlesbrough between 2006 and 2009 feel like a bygone era. His impressive work as England Under-21 manager was more about developing individuals rather than outmanoeuvring opposition coaches.
And at times, it has often felt like Southgate has lacked the tactical nous to find in-game solutions.
The best example of that came in 2018, when England were 1-0 up against Croatia and heading for the World Cup final. With England sitting back, the 3-5-2 became a 5-3-2 and Croatia’s main threat came from out wide. In particular, Croatia were dangerous down their right. Luka Modric’s combination play with right-back Sime Vrsaljko had been a major part of their play throughout the tournament. In contrast, on the other flank, Ivan Strinic was a considerably less threatening full-back. Croatia kept spreading the play out to the dangerous Vrsaljko on the outside of England’s midfield. Alli was tasked with shutting down both him and Modric, while left wing-back Ashley Young was pinned back by Croatia’s winger.
A simple solution would have been to abandon the two-striker system. Sterling, playing through the middle, would have been a natural at playing from the left and helping to nullify Vrsaljko. Danny Welbeck, a reliable tactical option, could have been introduced to play that role. But the change never came. Eventually, Vrsaljko’s cross led to Croatia’s equaliser. Demoralised, England never recovered and ended up losing 2-1.
Sime Vrsaljko caused England problems (Sebnem Coskun/Anadolu Agency/Getty Images)
By Euro 2020, Southgate was more flexible. England were comfortable with a back four or a back three and Southgate could easily deploy either system without too many problems, potentially surprising the opposition. Again, this level of tactical flexibility would have been highly uncommon in previous eras.
The question was whether Southgate got the decisions right. In the semi-final against Denmark, who used a 3-4-3 system that overloaded opponents out wide, Southgate surprisingly went with a back four rather than matching the Danes’ system. England went behind early on and were helped back into the game by some bizarre in-game management by Kasper Hjulmund, which involved substituting the Danes’ best performers on the night and eventually running out of players and finishing the game with 10 men through injury, despite the fact he’d been able to use six substitutes since the game had gone to extra time. England battled through, winning 2-1.
Then came the final against Italy. That appeared to be the time to play a back four. Yes, Italy’s system became a front five in possession, with the left back pushing forward to complete the quintet, but Leonardo Spinazzola was out of the tournament through injury and Emerson Palmieri was less of a threat.
Was England’s XI in the Euro 2020 final the wrong choice? (Michael Regan – UEFA/UEFA via Getty Images)
A bolder manager would have used the 4-2-3-1, including Bukayo Saka on the right flank and asking him to drop back in to make a five-man defence. Indeed, that’s exactly the type of system Southgate used in the Euro 2024 quarter-final against Switzerland, with Saka the outstanding player.
But Southgate went for caution and the back three. It was tough to have many complaints when one wing-back, Kieran Trippier, set up the other, Luke Shaw, for an early opener, but England offered almost nothing after that, the back three became a back five, and England eventually succumbed to Italian pressure. Only spot kicks cost England, with Saka an ironic fall guy considering he really should have started the game and therefore probably wouldn’t have made the end of 120 minutes.
Perhaps the most curious thing about Southgate’s reign, though, is that the one occasion where England failed to progress through the quarter-final featured probably the best game plan of his eight years in charge. In a meeting with the World Cup holders France at the World Cup 18 months ago, Southgate’s plan of getting Henderson to overlap Bukayo Saka down the right worked wonders. Saka wreaked havoc down that flank, constantly cutting inside, creating chances and being unfortunate not to win more fouls than he did. The expected goals tally favoured England, although Kane’s penalty miss cost them.
Raheem Sterling and Mason Mount in action against France in 2022 — neither would make Southgate’s Euro 2024 squad (Simon Bruty/Anychance/Getty Images)
Euro 2024 was more challenging for the England manager than some would have you believe because of various weaknesses in the side. But it shouldn’t have been this difficult.
There were two Englands at Euro 2024 — a team that played well below their potential in the group stage but at least maintained a good defensive record and squeezed out the kind of results that often bring success in international tournaments.
Then there was the side of the knockout stage, outplayed by both Slovakia and Switzerland, who were far inferior on paper. Southgate deserves some level of credit for the change in system against the latter, which nullified the dangerous Swiss left flank, and there was an improvement against the Netherlands for the semi-final.
But the lack of cohesive quality in this tournament, in terms of build-play, pressing, attacking combinations, or rotations of position, has made England look deeply average. The lack of substitutions against Slovakia seemed almost unbelievable considering England’s obvious trump card is their strength in depth.
Southgate’s task changed significantly since his first tournament in 2018. He now had talented creative players like Phil Foden and Jude Bellingham rather than willing runners like Lingard and Alli. He also had more gaps in his XI than six years ago. That asked more tactical questions of the manager, who failed to find obvious solutions.
Would England’s current generation benefit from a new approach? (Eddie Keogh – The FA/The FA via Getty Images)
But, at heart, Southgate isn’t truly a tactician. He’s someone who believes more in developing off-field harmony and keeping the group happy. It was interesting to see him conducting a post-match pitchside interview after the 2-1 defeat to Spain with Arsene Wenger wandering around in the background. Southgate felt a little like Wenger did in his latter days at Arsenal — a hugely likeable character, a diplomat, a thoughtful figure in press conferences, someone who cares about the development of people.
But just as it felt Wenger often couldn’t quite figure out why Arsenal had won or lost games, you’re rarely convinced that Southgate found the right tactical solutions. They are probably more like directors of football than football managers.
Still, in 2016, after the failure against Iceland at the European Championship and the embarrassing Sam Allardyce ‘era’, that’s precisely what England needed. Southgate must be considered a genuinely pivotal figure in England’s reanimation at international level. It has been of huge value to English football that he hasn’t remained a mere pundit, as he was for several years, but instead has taken on major jobs at the Football Association. If more people like Southgate were involved in English football, the game would be a much better place. But by this point, his rightful place within the FA’s hierarchy is no longer in the dugout.
Still, his successor will inherit an excellent situation and his task will be about fine-tuning rather than a major rebuild. If England win either of the next two major tournaments, Southgate will deserve a large share of the credit.
(Top photo: Frank Augstein – Pool/Getty Images)
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