It might not have escaped your attention that Real Madrid’s squad is looking rather powerful.
Carlo Ancelotti’s new-look system has Kylian Mbappe flanked by Vinicius Junior and Rodrygo in attack, with Jude Bellingham and Federico Valverde behind them and Aurelien Tchouameni as the midfield anchor.
Sunday’s 1-1 draw at Mallorca showed some early teething problems in their La Liga opener, but the question of how to best deploy such a star-studded line-up feels like one of those good problems to have — and, if all else fails, there’s exciting talent on the bench in Endrick, Arda Guler and Brahim Diaz.
Madrid’s offensive strength is impressive, and so is the story of the planning and strategy behind it. It’s even more striking when you consider Madrid’s place in the transfer market — they are far from being football’s biggest spenders.
So here are the key themes behind assembling the club’s latest squad of superstars.
The plan
In the summer of 2009, Florentino Perez returned as Real Madrid president for a second time, looking to restore the club to what he saw as the heights reached at the beginning of the century — under his previous stewardship. To do so, he sanctioned a €250million spend (£213m; $278m at today’s rates) on signings such as Cristiano Ronaldo, Kaka, Karim Benzema and Xabi Alonso.
Looking back, that summer was perhaps the height of Madrid’s galactico era. We associate that term with Luis Figo, Zinedine Zidane, Ronaldo Nazario or David Beckham — but those players arrived over four successive years (and in that order) between 2000 and 2003, during Perez’s first term.
In the campaigns following that huge outlay in 2009, Madrid only once spent a higher total — €361million in 2019-20, after the first season following Cristiano Ronaldo’s 2018 exit ended with no titles won. Again that might give the impression of Madrid as free spenders, but since 2009 the club’s average net spend on transfers (taking into account sales and signings) is just €39.1m a season.
During this time, a new strategy developed by Perez and Madrid’s general manager Jose Angel Sanchez began to take shape, heavily influenced by two key factors: the emergence of powerful European rivals backed by the infinite wealth of oil-rich states, such as Manchester City and Paris Saint-Germain, and the riches brought to English clubs by the Premier League’s runaway financial success. These factors also explain Madrid’s backing of the European Super League project.
Madrid had to get used to a new position as a less-dominant member of the transfer market. Faced with the growing difficulty of signing the game’s biggest established stars (almost) every summer, the club shifted towards signing younger talent, one or two steps earlier in their development, to finish moulding them in Spain.
Several members of this Madrid squad were signed in this way: Federico Valverde (€5million in 2015); Vinicius Jr (€40m in 2017); Rodrygo (€45m in 2018); Andriy Lunin (€8.5m plus extras in 2018); Brahim Diaz (€15m plus extras in 2019); Eder Militao (€50m in 2019); Eduardo Camavinga (€31m plus extras in 2021); Endrick (€35m plus €25m in extras in 2022); and Guler (€20m plus extras in 2023).
Madrid also began to work much more attentively in seeking out so-called “market opportunities” — where players could be signed for a reduced fee with their contracts running down, or as free agents.
That can also be seen in the current squad. Thibaut Courtois arrived for €35million in 2018, while David Alaba, Antonio Rudiger and Mbappe came in as free agents in 2021, 2022 and 2024 after not renewing with their clubs (Bayern Munich, Chelsea and PSG) — with each player receiving a signing-on fee (and in Mbappe’s case, a substantial one).
The recruitment team
Juni Calafat — who arrived at Real Madrid in 2013 and is now chief scout — is a key figure in this story. His skill set, background and approach to work have helped Madrid achieve what they wanted.
Calafat, who was born in Spain but spent much of his childhood in Sao Paulo, is described as a “football obsessive” by those who work with him and know him best. He heads up an extensive network of scouts all over the world. Many of them come from TV, where Calafat first made a name for himself as a journalist and analyst on the programme Fiebre Maldini while gaining important contacts in football. His knowledge of South American football in particular won him many admirers and eventually earned him a scouting position at Madrid.
Among his first recommendations was Casemiro.
Calafat’s collaborators help him watch the game in every corner of the globe and then sift through detailed reports. When a player is seen to be a “generational talent”, as it is often described within the club, Calafat passes the report up the ladder, especially to Jose Angel Sanchez. At this point, the player has already been seen in person and, normally, the reports are labelled “FICHAR” (to sign).
This is also when Calafat starts to get closer to the player and his environment, both professional (representation agency) and personal (family, friends). What Calafat discovers helps inform Madrid’s impression of the player’s personality and approach to work — a factor that is sometimes as important as watching talent on the pitch or analysis of the data behind it.
Many players, family members and agents consider this a differentiating element, as Calafat also knows how to win over hearts and minds, with the idea of keeping Madrid a step ahead of their rivals.
Calafat’s team has gained so much prestige that in recent years some members have been poached by rival clubs, such as when Gonzalo Novillo joined Real Betis or Paulo Xavier (who was Calafat’s main guy in Brazil) left for Arsenal, both in 2023. Calafat himself has received inquiries and interest from different Premier League clubs about coming to work for them.
At Madrid, they also boast of how different teams are increasingly imitating their formula by moving to sign young talent from South America, as can be seen in the signings of Julian Alvarez or Claudio Echeverri by Manchester City, or Angelo Gabriel and Estevao by Chelsea.
Things get serious when Sanchez, known at Madrid and in the world of football as ‘JAS’, enters the scene. He leads negotiations and controls the financial side of things, keeping president Perez, who has the final say, informed regularly.
However, Perez is not usually very involved, except in the case of finally signing Mbappe this year, when he played a key role in communicating with the player in the early stages of negotiations.
When competing with more economically powerful rivals in contract offers sent to players, another key strength is in Madrid’s showcasing of their plans to targets.
They make clear the detailed sporting project designed for them, giving examples of other players who said yes and ended up moving to another level, and explain why they cannot enter into auctions with other clubs or match offers from other suitors, especially from the Premier League.
It worked with Tchouameni and Endrick in 2022 and Bellingham and Guler in 2023 — who were all signed despite lucrative rival offers — but this summer it failed with Leny Yoro, as the centre-back made the surprise choice (for Madrid at least) to play at Manchester United.
The management
You may have noticed the absence of one important name here: Carlo Ancelotti. In truth, it has been a long time since any coaches at Madrid have had decision-making power over transfer policy. In the case of the Italian, he is consulted and informed of moves, but little else.
In the summer of 2023, when Karim Benzema left for Saudi Arabian club Al Ittihad, Ancelotti asked for the signing of Harry Kane as a replacement, but the club barely moved for the Englishman.
In January 2024, faced with a plague of injuries in defence, Ancelotti asked for a centre-back, but that didn’t happen either. Despite the departure of Nacho and the failure to sign Yoro, that looks set to repeat itself this summer.
It is clear to Madrid that coaches move on but the project and the management that carries it out remain. What happened with Kepa Arrizabalaga in 2018 was instructive in this regard.
Madrid had made great strides in attempting to sign him from Athletic Bilbao in January, but then-manager Zidane dismissed his profile because he trusted Keylor Navas and wanted to keep his son, academy goalkeeper Luca, in the squad.
When the season ended, Zidane left and the board felt they had missed a great opportunity to sign Arrizabalaga, who ended up at Chelsea in the summer.
In any case, Ancelotti is aware that he has a squad that is capable of making history. In fact, after winning the UEFA Super Cup last week, he was asked to compare what he has now and what he had in 2014 when he won La Decima (the club’s 10th Champions League/European Cup) and the Copa del Rey.
“I talked about it with the staff, but it’s very difficult,” he said. “In 2014, the team was fantastic, with Cristiano, Benzema and Gareth Bale, it was an exceptional strikeforce. What doesn’t change is the quality of the team between 2014 and 10 years later.”
At board level, they say Ancelotti has played a key role in this new era of recruitment, as he has understood very well what the club is looking to achieve, and he accepts the shortage of signings. That was apparent from the moment he looked like coming back as Madrid manager in the summer of 2021.
In one of his first meetings with Perez and Sanchez, Ancelotti said he had full confidence in Vinicius Jr’s potential. His development had stalled somewhat under previous managers. Three years later, the Brazilian has scored in two Champions League finals and is now a leading candidate for the Ballon d’Or.
With Bellingham, Ancelotti fashioned a new position for him last season and the Englishman too is another candidate for the game’s brightest individual prize. Now Ancelotti is reinventing the player again, more in midfield.
There are also failures, of course. The Brazilian 22-year-old attacking midfielder Reinier Jesus, for example, was signed in 2020 for €30million and has yet to make his senior debut with Madrid, nor is he expected to. Perhaps the biggest letdown was Luka Jovic, who was signed for €60m in that big-spend summer of 2019 but never came close to justifying the investment.
What’s next?
Economically, Real Madrid is an example of good management. This is reflected in their accounts, which show no losses despite the Covid-19 pandemic or the rising cost of the Santiago Bernabeu reconstruction works. Even Javier Tebas — La Liga president and a figure considered as a public enemy by Madrid — has been complimentary of this.
At the sporting level, having won 29 titles since 2010, including six Champions Leagues and the Spanish league title five times, Madrid’s record is rather impressive, too.
With these two factors in mind, the plan at the Bernabeu is to keep doing what they have been — while always remaining attentive to possible new scenarios and changes in the industry.
(Top photo: Antonio Villalba/Real Madrid via Getty Images)
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